Modernity

Much of the confusion surrounding modernity comes from its temporal name: literally, it means being “new.” More specifically, this newness means inaugurating something unprecedented in the flow of time, a novel way of existing. One might even say that its ultimate ambition is not merely a form of being, but a form of becoming.

The dividing line between the ancient and the modern lies in their views of one thing: universals. In the ancient world, realism was the prevailing orthodoxy, holding universals to be ultimate reality. The modern path begins with the nominalist revolution, which holds that individual things themselves are real and universals are merely names.

The Divide Between Ancient and Modern: The Nominalist Revolution

Scholastic philosophy had long favored realism. Working within Aristotelian thought and syllogistic logic, it could assume that “God is rational.” God was therefore intelligible, and scholastic philosophy could supplement revelation as a guide to life.

William of Ockham opposed this view in the early fourteenth century. He placed greater emphasis on omnipotence as God’s most important attribute. An omnipotent God can, of course, do anything; the only limitation should be the law of noncontradiction. Since everything in the world is the product of God’s contingent will, we cannot presume to know His rationality. Nor should there be anything that could be called “laws of nature.” Ockham’s thinking thus thoroughly undermined the theological foundations of scholasticism.

Another important implication is that God cannot create universals. God needs no preconditions to create anything, whereas universals would be prerequisites for their particular instances. Their existence would therefore limit His omnipotence. Ockham’s best-known maxim is “Entities should not be multiplied without necessity” (Non sunt multiplicanda entia sine necessitate). In its narrower sense here, “entities” refers to universals.

In Ockham’s account, then, universals do not exist. Language therefore reveals no reality, and names are simply symbols. This is nominalism.

The nominalist revolution had enormous consequences, contributing in some measure to a collapse of faith: people could no longer know how they ought to live. Scholastic moral philosophy was teleological, with the good as its ultimate end. But the God of nominalism was entirely free, and sin and punishment appeared contingent. We could not know what way of life would bring salvation, or even be sure that God truly loved humanity. The late fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries also saw a succession of upheavals across Europe—the Black Death, the schism in the Church, and the Hundred Years’ War—which further shook scholasticism’s foundations and reinforced the idea of a capricious God.

Humanism and the Reformation

As the nominalist revolution swept through Europe in the late fourteenth century, Petrarch invented individuality. His emphasis on the finitude of the individual as a being made humanism possible.

Humanism did not seek answers by following the nominalist revolution’s own line of thought. Instead, it tried to interpret piety and morality through Christian Neoplatonism. Humanists generously redeemed ancient heroes such as Socrates and Cicero, and with those heroes came Plato’s assertion of the soul’s immortality. As the priority of the human being was elevated, humanity eventually became the “image of God,” endowed with an intrinsic dignity and power. Humanists thus restored the special place of the human soul in the cosmic hierarchy, making it the connection between the intelligible and material worlds. This did not directly answer the questions raised by nominalism, but it offered guidance on how to live that seemed much more workable than Ockham’s account.

Northern humanism, represented by Erasmus, combined traditional humanist views with an emphasis on inward devotion. It held that the true core of religion was inner piety rather than doctrinal assertions.

Erasmus’s contemporary Martin Luther shared a similar insight on this point. Deeply troubled by the crisis brought on by the nominalist revolution, he arrived at the solution he needed after his famous “Tower Experience”: justification by faith. In theory, this solution carried the crisis to a new level; in practice, it launched the vast movement of the Reformation.

The basic meaning of justification by faith is simple. Nothing one does can save oneself: no works can satisfy God. Salvation is therefore possible only through faith. Faith can arise only through grace, and grace only through Scripture. Hence his watchwords: “faith alone, grace alone, Scripture alone” (sola fides, sola gratia, sola scriptura).

Luther’s most distinctive insight here concerns his understanding of “the righteousness of God.” In the Christian tradition, divine righteousness was usually understood as God’s justice and perfection: He would deal fairly with each person according to their actions. But this understanding was clearly vulnerable to nominalism. Luther instead understood it as God’s grace, a gift to humanity that could not be earned through human actions. Divine righteousness was not a just response to conduct, but unconditional love and mercy. Under this interpretation, God’s response to humanity no longer compromised His omnipotence and therefore did not conflict with nominalism.

We can see that Luther’s God is an impersonal one, more like a fate governing all things—a fate that even determines human faith itself. We say that people need justification by faith, but for Luther they have no power to justify themselves. People have faith and are saved because God wills it and mercifully allows it to happen, not because they actively decide to believe.

For Luther, then, human freedom does not exist; God is the cause of everything. Extending this view, he naturally rejected humanism’s central claim that the human being is an independent being, lowering humanity’s standing at the level of individual existence. This clearly separated him from Erasmus, and the two later conducted a series of arguments through their writings.

After Petrarch, Erasmus, and Luther, the original predicament remained unresolved. Its development, together with renewed engagement with the ancient Greek classics, had turned it into the even more contentious question of whether free will exists. Luther’s position needs no further explanation here. Erasmus, in his Hyperaspistes, constructed a system of three kinds of grace, arguing that God had already given humanity free will through the first, natural grace.

Their dispute produced no definite conclusion, and it is difficult to judge which was right. In the long run, however, Erasmus’s subsequent influence in Europe surpassed Luther’s. His Christian humanism, with its more worldly concerns, was more appealing than Luther’s God-centered, apocalyptic outlook—unsurprisingly—and gained a more important place in both Protestant and Catholic churches. Luther’s short-term impact was, of course, incomparable: from the Ninety-five Theses in 1517 to the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, Lutheranism and Calvinism arose, transforming the European order completely.

Descartes’s Path to Truth

Descartes was born into the aftermath of Luther’s world and lived through the fiercest period of Europe’s religious wars. It is difficult to determine exactly what his own religious beliefs were, but he was certainly deeply influenced by the Rosicrucians. Their members were essentially Hermetic thinkers, generally seeking to understand nature’s hidden order in order to gain control over it. They also believed that nature had to be understood through mathematics rather than ordinary language. In his later reflections, Descartes followed a path away from politics and into the self, attempting in a Hermetic manner to “separate his mind from his body.” He also explicitly believed that he should conceal himself to avoid sharing the fate of Bruno, killed by religious persecution in 1600. Hence his maxim: “He lives well who lives hidden.”

To Descartes, the existing order of the world resembled a medieval German village: houses crowded together without any plan. Decisions were made neither through reason nor through any method for applying it. He believed that one should instead play the role of an engineer, planning an orderly town for the world. In his Discourse on Method, he proposed the method such an engineer would need: scientists could master all knowledge through a “universal science,” mathesis universalis. With its emergence, everything would have to change fundamentally, including states and religions.

The key to this universal science was certainty—not certainty of perception, but certainty of judgment. For Descartes, judgment came from intuitive knowledge combined with deduction, so ensuring certainty meant ensuring that intuitive knowledge was correct. Although he emphasized that deduction could provide certainty, he thought this held only for relatively short chains of reasoning. What we could truly know, then, were “simple natures” and their combinations.

To obtain certainty in intuitive knowledge, Descartes confronted skepticism directly and decided first to discard everything uncertain. Acknowledging the power of the nominalist God, he had to reject everything received through the senses, since some of it might be illusory; then every result of reasoning, since reasoning could be mistaken; then every thought, since it might be a dream. In other words, an omnipotent God might be deceiving us beyond remedy. No definite rule seemed able to constrain Him: mathematical laws and the law of noncontradiction were His creations and could therefore be changed by His will. This skepticism was not new. Luther had faced similar objections because of his emphasis on divine omnipotence, but had merely declared that “the Holy Spirit is no skeptic,” rather than answering the problem directly. Like Kierkegaard’s later “leap of faith,” this left the matter to faith itself and avoided explanation. Descartes did not do that. Here he introduced the famous “I think, therefore I am”: even if everything is taken to be false, the one thinking that thought must be something real. Thought has a reflexivity, a self-reference. Whenever I have an idea of a chair, for instance, I necessarily also have an idea of a self aware of the chair.

Descartes thus rejected skepticism and built his system of truth around the fixed point of “I think.” At the same time, thinking was humanity’s essential attribute. Human beings were conscious beings with the capacity for independent thought and choice—that is, with a will. Descartes thereby answered the central question in the dispute between Luther and Erasmus, affirming that human beings have free will.

Hobbes’s Wisdom of Fear

Like Descartes, Hobbes derived an entire philosophical system from an initial conclusion. Their starting points, however, were completely different.

For Hobbes, bodies undergo only one kind of change, arising from their movement through space and their collisions with one another. All activity is generated and destroyed mechanically, with no divine intervention beyond the initial beginning. It is worth noting that this absence of divine intervention means that bodily motion contains no rational or natural purpose. For Hobbes, God exists in the universe’s continuous motion; one might say that God is equivalent to the causal process itself. Human beings therefore have nothing special or supernatural about them. They are simply complicated automata, like more elaborate clocks. Their mechanical mainspring is passion, or desire. Hobbes holds that we are always driven by passion: we may seem to choose what we do, but we can never choose what we want. Human freedom extends only to choosing how to satisfy our passions, not to choosing what those passions are.

Hobbes therefore concludes that, once we abandon illusory notions of freedom, we recognize that happiness lies not in moral perfection, immortal fame, or perfect piety, but in satisfying bodily desires. Of all those desires, only one is present at every moment: the desire to stay alive. From this comes his crucial conclusion: “The root of human action is the fear of violent death.”

Since our real freedom consists only in pursuing the objects of our passions without external restriction, its extent depends entirely on power—the capacity to satisfy our desires as fully, freely, and safely as possible. Good and evil are consequently not measured by progress toward reason, nature, or some supernatural end, but by our desires. Good is what pleases us; evil is what displeases us. Good enhances our activity; evil obstructs it.

Through successive arguments from physics and anthropology, we find that human beings in the state of nature all try to acquire and possess power. Hence the famous conclusion: “The state of nature is a state of continual war between human beings.” Because people naturally fear violent death, they must be willing to covenant with others, relinquishing their claims to power over everything and accepting limited freedom, so that they can treat others as they wish to be treated.

But such a covenant is not entirely voluntary. People surrender their claims only under compulsion and retreat to limited freedom, so its enforcement requires supervision. The supervisor can naturally only be God. In practice, however, God does not intervene in such details, so some actual power must enforce the covenant in His place. This is the Leviathan: the arrival of the sovereign power. For Hobbes, Leviathan is no threat to the great majority of people; it is their fortress of safety. Only a few arrogant people think themselves superior and entitled to stand above others. Leviathan exists to restrain them, hence its title as “king of the proud.” Contrary to the common impression, Hobbes’s Leviathan is therefore founded on the idea of human equality: only its existence can secure that equality. We can certainly argue that exercising this power will inevitably produce inequality in practice. But Hobbes’s argument is purely theoretical, not a discussion of particular implementations. At the very least, Leviathan makes equality theoretically possible.

We can see the shadow of nominalism’s God in Leviathan. In the sovereign state, it occupies the same position as God in the universe: the source and unifying ground of everything. Like the nominalist God, Leviathan is a symbolic monster that owes its subjects nothing and makes no covenant with them. The covenant exists only between individuals.

Starting afresh, Hobbes thus arrives at his doctrine of the state of nature. Together with Descartes’s universal doubt, it becomes a dual starting point for the construction of the modern human being. Yet the two theories differ greatly, above all over necessity and free will. Descartes is a dualist: human beings are material and can therefore be compared with other natural bodies, but they also possess immaterial thought and can therefore be compared with God. Hobbes is a monist: human beings are no different from other matter in nature, so everything happens by necessity.

Kant’s Predicament and the Antinomies

As we have seen, Descartes and Hobbes avoided direct discussion of God and turned instead to nature, yet could not escape disagreement over necessity and free will. From this perspective, their disagreement is the same as that between Erasmus and Luther, merely dressed in the language of nature rather than God.

Immanuel Kant recognized this contradiction and formulated it as the third antinomy, concerning free will:

  • Thesis: phenomena in the universe are governed not only by causality according to natural laws, but also by a causality of freedom.
    • Proof by contradiction: suppose there is no free will, only natural laws. Under causality, everything must have a cause, and that cause must have a cause of its own. Every beginning is therefore relative, and we can find no absolute beginning. Yet natural law requires a sufficient cause for anything to happen. Freedom must therefore exist; otherwise nothing could happen.
  • Antithesis: there is no such thing as free will; everything in the universe operates solely according to natural laws.
    • Proof by contradiction: if free will exists, the causal chain of natural law is broken. Wherever freedom acts, its beginning must be absolute, disconnecting cause from effect. Human beings could then form no unified experience.

The two sides of this antinomy correspond to Kant’s lifelong concerns: “the starry heavens above me and the moral law within me.” Much of his philosophical work was an attempt to resolve the antinomies. He believed that acknowledging the limits of reason would make this possible. We must restrict our understanding to its proper domain, which Kant called the “island of truth,” surrounded by boundless temptations. He also distinguished pure reason from practical reason: the former considers causality and natural laws, while the latter guides morality. This separation was intended to resolve the antinomy. For Kant, then, antinomies arise from the misuse of reason. If we can use reason correctly, we can master nature and attain freedom.

The Contradictions of Enlightenment and the Crisis of Modernity

Modernity, broadly understood, can thus be seen as a series of attempts to answer the fundamental questions raised by the nominalist revolution. None of those attempts is perfect, so modernity itself contains many problems, which naturally have enormous consequences when they guide practice.

The secularizing process of modernization is not really a matter of “God is dead,” nor perhaps of what Heidegger called God’s withdrawal. Rather, we have gradually transferred divine attributes to humanity, nature, social forces, and history: humanity’s infinite will, nature’s universal mechanical causality, society’s general will and invisible hand, and so on. From this perspective, modernity’s disenchantment of God is also a process of re-enchantment. Science can provide a coherent account of the whole only by making humanity or nature divine in some sense. This is, in effect, a radical Pelagianism.

During this transfer, we may regard human beings as godlike superhumans who can realize an ideal world through will alone. At the same time, we understand nature as a quasi-omnipotent force and proceed toward fatalism. The problem is plainly one of free will. Transferring God’s attributes has not changed the antinomy; forgetting its theological origins has only made it more intractable.

Attributing divine qualities to humanity carries considerable potential danger. The Reign of Terror during the French Revolution is a striking example. For the revolutionaries, an action could be moral only if it conformed to rational universality and realized human freedom. One major impetus for the Terror was therefore their belief that particular wills had to be eliminated. But human beings, as finite beings, necessarily possess particularity. They cannot be purely universal.

The modern view of history developed in the late eighteenth century understood history as the process by which humanity uses reason to create a free world. After the French Revolution, this view too was called into question, and thinkers such as Hegel began reconsidering history’s foundations. For Hegel, pursuing absolute freedom could lead only to disaster; rational freedom had to accommodate ordinary nature. He still believed that freedom was history’s necessary and inevitable goal, but that it had to be a more concrete freedom. Then, in the twentieth century, two world wars, the Great Depression, totalitarianism, and the Holocaust gravely undermined the progressive view of history. People had imagined history in Pelagian terms as a product of free will, yet its unfolding was guided by an “invisible hand” or the “cunning of reason.” The progressive, Pelagian understanding many had held gradually began to give way to a more Manichaean view of historical change.

Summary

In a broad sense, the nominalist revolution created modernity, and the intellectual problems it generated drove modernity’s development.

Ockham introduced nominalism and shattered a millennium of scholastic harmony. Humanists and Reformers alike accepted nominalism at the ontological level. At the level of individual beings, however, the Reformers denied human priority and therefore human freedom, making the conflict between God and free will the central problem. Descartes and Hobbes did not investigate the relationship between God and humanity directly. Instead, they rebuilt their philosophical systems around nature. Yet the conflict between their systems closely resembled that between humanism and the Reformation: nature had replaced God, turning the problem into one of natural necessity versus human free will. Kant then formulated it as an antinomy, which he and the various thinkers after the Enlightenment continued to investigate.

Because the antinomy remains unresolved, the world we inhabit, guided by modernity’s ideas, naturally contains many problems that can be traced back to it. People today have generally forgotten that its true origin lies in the theological transformation brought about by nominalism. That forgetting makes the problem still more intractable.